{"id":3189,"date":"2012-03-18T13:00:00","date_gmt":"2012-03-18T05:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/shehuizhuyizhe.com\/?p=3189"},"modified":"2022-08-05T01:44:14","modified_gmt":"2022-08-04T17:44:14","slug":"china-the-fall-of-bo-xilai","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/chinaworker.info\/en\/2012\/03\/18\/3189\/","title":{"rendered":"China: The fall of Bo Xilai"},"content":{"rendered":"

For the first time in two decades an open power struggle erupts within China\u2019s one-party state<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

Editorial statement by chinaworker.info<\/span><\/p>\n

Dramatic events are unfolding as China\u2019s once-in-a-decade leadership transition gets underway. A serious schism in the Chinese Communist Party\u2019s (CCP) top ranks has come into full public view \u2013 something unprecedented since the mass anti-government protests of 1989. Bo Xilai, standard-bearer of the neo-Maoist \u2018new left\u2019, has been dismissed as provincial party chief of Chongqing.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

While dramatic, these developments are not completely unexpected. As we explained last year on chinaworker.info, \u201cStill, the [populist] campaign of Bo is an important development signifying that the relative cohesion of the ruling group \u2013 in public at least \u2013 since the 1989 Beijing massacre is beginning to unravel.\u201d (China: Repression or \u2018reform\u2019?<\/i>, chinaworker.info 11 July 2011).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Bo\u2019s exit follows a major scandal resulting in the arrest of his former right-hand man, Wang Lijun, who until six weeks ago was vice-mayor and police chief of Chongqing. Wang has been labelled a \u2018traitor\u2019 by the regime after what was possibly a defection attempt at the US Consulate in Chengdu on 6 February. He is also widely suspected of corruption. \u201cThe Wang Lijun saga has evolved into one of the biggest political scandals over the past 60 years,\u201d argues political commentator Chen Ziming. The fall of both men is part of a wider power struggle within the regime, rather than merely an anti-corruption \u2018clean up\u2019.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Former<\/a>
Former vice-mayor and police chief of Chongqing Wang Lijun<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Beijing tilts to the right
<\/b><\/span>
The Washington Post describes the purging of Bo Xilai as a \u201cstinging defeat\u201d for China\u2019s neo-Maoists. His fall undoubtedly marks a strengthening of the proponents of economic \u2018reform\u2019 (market liberalism) within the commanding group against the nationalist and state interventionist \u2018left\u2019, although to leave matters there would mean simplifying what is an extremely complex power struggle.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThis is an earthquake before the 18th Party Congress,\u201d said scholar Wu Jiaxiang, referring to the autumn meeting at which a new leadership will take over from the current team led by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Premier Wen is the main proponent of \u2018reform\u2019 within the regime, and his blistering attack \u2013 without naming Bo \u2013 on the \u201cChongqing party committee\u201d made on live television from Wednesday\u2019s closing scene at the 10-day National People\u2019s Congress (NPC), presaged Bo\u2019s formal dismissal, which followed a few hours later. Another prominent figure in the reform camp is Guangdong party boss Wang Yang, seen publicly as the nemesis of Bo Xilai (much energy has been expended debating the rival Guangdong and Chongqing models). Wang\u2019s slogan is \u201csmall government, great society\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

Wang\u2019s chances of promotion at the autumn congress have clearly been boosted by Bo\u2019s sudden demise, but also by Wang\u2019s perceived role in brokering a peaceful settlement to the Wukan conflict. Wukan, where villagers achieved tentative concessions through well-organised mass struggle, has been hi-jacked for publicity and factional purposes by Wang and the reform wing. Despite well-publicised elections earlier this month that resulted in protest leaders winning positions in Wukan\u2019s village committee, state repression, surveillance and threats especially against youth activists, are on the increase inside the village.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018Revolution\u2019 warning<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

In the same speech that lambasted Chongqing over the Wang Lijun affair, Wen warned, \u201cWithout the success of political structural reform\u2026 a historical tragedy like the Cultural Revolution could occur again.\u201d These comments reflect the deep insecurity of the ruling group and their fear of revolutionary upheavals given China\u2019s widening wealth gap and mounting popular discontent. But it is today\u2019s events in Egypt, Russia, and the US \u2018Occupy\u2019 movement, rather than a repeat of the chaotic 1960s, that really terrifies China\u2019s elite. An incredible opinion poll conducted in seven cities during the NPC meeting by the English-language Global Times, a top government mouthpiece, showed that almost half the population (49.4 percent) believed China was \u201cclose\u201d or \u201cmaybe close\u201d to a revolution.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cIn [Wen\u2019s] nine years in office, China\u2019s electricity generation has tripled, its steel production has quadrupled and the number of cars and trucks manufactured each year has increased nearly sixfold,\u201d noted the South China Morning Post (14 March 2012). But as this newspaper then added, \u201cChina\u2019s Gini coefficient, a widely followed measure of income inequality, has shot up from a level similar to America\u2019s when Wen took over, to a level today closer to Swaziland\u2019s.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Wen\u2019s public attack on the Chongqing model and the decision to purge Bo, reflect a consensus within the top group of state leaders including not just president Hu Jintao, an opponent of Bo, but also Bo\u2019s ally Zhou Yongkang, who is China\u2019s top security official, and president-in-waiting Xi Jinping. Both Xi and Bo are princelings \u2013 the sons of former top party officials who enjoy inherited privileges within the party-state apparatus.\u00a0<\/span>

Factional struggles<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

There are some earlier precedents for the removal of a senior provincial leader in this fashion. In 2006, Chen Liangyu the party boss of Shanghai was sacked and subsequently sentenced to 18 years imprisonment for corruption. This was part of an internal power struggle between the \u2018Shanghai gang\u2019 of ex-president Jiang Zemin and\u00a0\u2018Tuanpai<\/i>\u00a0faction\u2019 of Hu Jintao, who\u2019s move against Chen was aimed at curbing the powers of the former, and affording greater freedom of action to Hu himself.<\/span><\/p>\n

In general, and this also seems to apply in Bo\u2019s case, purges at senior level are achieved through negotiations and horse-trading between the factions. Chen was replaced as head of Shanghai\u2019s party apparatus by a factional ally \u2013 Xi Jinping. A delicate balance must be maintained to prevent an all-out factional war erupting. For this reason, it is vice-premier Zhang Dejiang, who like Bo is a prot\u00e9g\u00e9 of ex-president Jiang, who takes over as head of Chongqing\u2019s government. Thus factional \u2018balance\u2019 is maintained.<\/span><\/p>\n

But Bo\u2019s case is of a different order to the Shanghai purge of 2006, involving someone who is famous on the national stage and with a considerable base of support outside the government apparatus. After Hu and Wen, Bo is unquestionably the most well known political figure in China. He has used his control of Chongqing as a platform to conduct the nearest thing to an election campaign within the framework of the authoritarian state. The Chongqing model (examined below) has been massively hyped by Bo to back up his quest for a seat on the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, which is the summit of power within the Chinese state.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

That dream is almost certainly over for Bo, based on the current balance of forces. But Bo\u2019s removal can trigger important and unforeseen political repercussions. This is especially the case within the neo-Maoist \u2018new left\u2019, most of whom still harbour illusions in the CCP-state and adore Bo, while opposing today\u2019s \u201cneo-liberal capitalist\u201d leadership. At the time of writing, Maoist online groups are calling for protesters to go to Chongqing. Security forces in all major cities have been placed on alert and PAP (paramilitary) units have been moved from Hubei province to Chongqing \u2013 signs that the regime does not rule out the possibility of protests. Even if no such street protests materialise, the removal of Bo raises the prospect of a more turbulent and infected leadership transition process.<\/span><\/p>\n

Much is still unclear, and much will remain murky given the nature of CCP internal power games. But the timing of Bo\u2019s dismissal was also remarkable. Senior party figures were informed of Bo\u2019s dismissal late on Wednesday night (14 March) as the NPC ended. A one-line announcement was issued the next morning by the official Xinhua news agency.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It is possible that the decision to purge Bo was not taken until very late in the NPC proceedings, after he hosted a packed press conference on Friday 9 March, at which he pledged to continue the Chongqing model. This lack of humility \u2013 further evidence of Bo\u2019s independent style \u2013 undoubtedly angered the central leadership. Further measures against Bo, including criminal charges, cannot be excluded given the ongoing investigation of Wang Lijun, which is pregnant with political surprises. But this will mainly depend on the logic of the power struggle, not on the strength \u2013 or lack thereof \u2013 of any evidence implicating Bo.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The NPC meeting showed that Bo still enjoys significant support within the state apparatus, including the military. This speaks against any further measures. It is instead possible Bo will keep his Politburo seat (not to be confused with the more powerful Politburo Standing Committee) and may be shunted to a ceremonial position elsewhere within the state. As one commentator said a \u201csoft landing\u201d looks possible for Bo.\u00a0<\/span>

Strike against the \u2018left\u2019<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

In a parallel development, to limit protests over Bo\u2019s removal, four left-leaning (neo-Maoist) websites were closed down by the authorities. This therefore represents a broader attack on the \u2018nationalist left\u2019 or \u2018new left\u2019 by the central party leadership, not just on Bo\u2019s person.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The websites under attack include the influential Maoist site Utopia, which sometimes carries articles from chinaworker.info and the CWI (Committee for a Workers\u2019 International), but nonetheless represents a very different, and increasingly nationalistic, political standpoint from our own. Notwithstanding these political differences, we unreservedly protest against this undemocratic crackdown, which also exposes the emptiness of talk about \u2018political reform\u2019 and openness from Wen and the CCP\u2019s liberal wing.<\/span><\/p>\n

Maoist groupings like those around Utopia have acted as cheerleaders for Bo Xilai, despite the lack of anything concrete to suggest he represents a real alternative to the current pro-capitalist leadership. Some neo-Maoists have hailed Chongqing as a \u201cliberated zone within a capitalist China\u201d and the \u201cYan\u2019an of the century\u201d (a reference to the area of northern China under CCP control during the civil war).<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

\"Bo<\/a>
Bo Xilai leads changhong singing red campaign<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

\u00a0Chongqing model \u2013 myth and reality<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

But as CWI supporter Zhang Shujie, who comes from Chongqing, points out, \u201cThe so-called Chongqing model seems to hold more attraction for people outside Chongqing, looking and hoping for an alternative to the CCP\u2019s capitalist policies, than for people who live there. Bo Xilai\u2019s government has not been fundamentally different to the CCP elsewhere, but he has a populist style which alarms the leadership. In fact, foreign investment has increased faster than any other province under Bo\u2019s rule and his government has adopted one of the most radical programmes for privatising farm land.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Apart from Bo\u2019s \u2018red culture\u2019 campaign, involving choirs singing Mao-era songs (but significantly not\u00a0The Internationale<\/i>\u00a0which is identified with anti-government protests, as in 1989), and text messages with Mao quotations, his policies have more in common with \u2018social democracy\u2019 than Maoism. Bo has promoted \u201csocial fairness and market economics\u201d and \u201cmodern communitarian values that resonate with Chinese culture\u2019s Confucian roots,\u201d according to his supporter, Shanghai-based venture capitalist Eric Li.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Pointing out that Bo suffered during the Cultural Revolution (his family were imprisoned for five years) the Financial Times (Red Alert<\/i>, 3 June 2011) concluded that his invocation of Maoist themes \u201cis more about style than substance \u2013 an attempt to tap into a sense of nostalgia by resurrecting the trappings of Maoism without reviving any of the disastrous policies associated with it.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Without taking any responsibility for Mao\u2019s bureaucratic policies, we would point out this newspaper\u2019s viewpoint is typically distorted: clearly the \u201csense of nostalgia\u201d for the Mao years must be based on something \u2013 and that is a very understandable backlash against the \u201cdisastrous policies\u201d of today\u2019s CCP, which include privatising healthcare, schooling and housing, with a concomitant surge in inequality.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Chongqing is the largest city in Western China, and has experienced one of the strongest GDP growth rates of all provinces, reaching 16.4 percent last year. Since 2007, when Bo took the helm, the share of Chongqing\u2019s GDP coming from the private sector has risen from just 25 percent to 60 percent. Chongqing\u2019s mayor and Bo sidekick, Huang Qifan, who looks (for now at least) as if he will keep his job, famously said of these policies, \u201cWe are pursuing the Reagan-Thatcher model of the 1980s.\u201d Clearly, therefore, the Chongqing model does not represent an anti-capitalist alternative.<\/span><\/p>\n

Populist and authoritarian<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

Supporters of Bo Xilai point to social reforms such as the public housing plan, launched in 2010, to build 800,000 low-cost units for low-income families squeezed out of the mass housing market, which is almost entirely privatised. Even this programme, however, falls far short of a genuine plan to house the needy. Since last year, the central government has launched its own mega-plan for public housing, taking its cue (unaccredited of course) from Chongqing. The national plan is reproducing on a larger scale all the deficiencies of the Chongqing prototype.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Critics say Chongqing\u2019s new public housing units are too small and too far away from the city. They resemble \u201cdormitories for individual workers, rather than permanent housing for urban families,\u201d claimed a report by research firm GaveKal Dragonomics, entitled\u00a0Chongqing\u2019s Public Housing Predicament<\/i>. The aim of the projects was to attract investors to build factories near Chongqing rather than provide decent housing, this report concluded.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Bo\u2019s policies can be summarised as limited social populism combined with authoritarianism. \u201cSome of his supporters see him as the Vladimir Putin of China. Mr Bo is a populist with an iron fist,\u201d commented The Economist, predicting he could become police chief in the central government. (China\u2019s new leaders<\/i>, 23 June 2011).<\/span><\/p>\n

Perhaps more significant than the \u2018red culture\u2019 campaign in propelling Bo into the national spotlight, was his controversial \u2018smash the black\u2019 anti-gang crackdown. This campaign, spearheaded by the now disgraced Wang Lijun, led to 2,000 arrests, 500 prosecutions, and 13 executions, including the former top judicial official of Chongqing, Wen Qiang. The extent of gangster control in China\u2019s cities left many aghast at the audacity and ruthlessness of the Chongqing authorities\u2019 campaign.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It was estimated that criminal syndicates (known in China as triads) employed 200,000 people in Chongqing. As in other cities, organised crime had penetrated the police force and the government and, in Chongqing, enjoyed the protection of Wen Qiang. An important factor in Bo\u2019s anti-crime drive was to embarrass his factional rival Wang Yang, who preceded Bo as Chongqing\u2019s party chief before moving to Guangdong. By implication, Wang had tolerated \u2018the black\u2019 during his tenure. Not surprisingly, the apparent success of the Chongqing campaign irritated many in the central leadership. Allegations of torture, forced confessions, and ignoring \u2018due process\u2019 have surfaced, becoming a factor in the downfall of both Wang Lijun and Bo Xilai.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Why was Bo purged?<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

The most important reasons for the dismissal of Bo flow from the nature of the Chinese regime and the fear of a mounting backlash to its capitalist-restorationist policies. It was distrust of Bo\u2019s unpredictable methods, rather than any alleged alternative political or economic platform, that brought him down.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

As we explained previously on chinaworker.info: \u201cChina manifests a peculiar form of \u2018Bonapartism\u2019 \u2013 by committee, rather than in the person of a \u2018strongman\u2019. This too is not accidental. The experience of Mao\u2019s rule and also Deng Xiaoping\u2019s, with erratic swings and accompanying social upheavals, produced the current \u2018compromise\u2019 system in which the powers of the leading group are subject to \u2018checks and balances\u2019 realised through an exhaustive process of negotiations and trade-offs between factions, provincial governments, and business-based clans.\u201d (China: Repression or \u2018reform\u2019?<\/i>, 11 July 2011, http:\/\/chinaworker.info\/en\/content\/news\/1507\/)<\/span><\/p>\n

Bo Xilai attempted for reasons of his own pursuit of power to bypass this rigid system. Unchecked, this could have set a dangerous example for others to follow. Susan Shirk, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State under Bill Clinton, offered this view: \u201cBo\u2019s open campaigning for power, and his use of the media to mobilize popular support, shattered the facade of unity at the top of the party. That campaigning, not any of the things he did in Chongqing, was the reason they had to get rid of him. Ever since Tiananmen Square [the 1989 revolt] they have tried to keep leadership in a black box.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

The princelings<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

Bo is a princeling, the son of Bi Yibo, one of \u2018the eight immortals\u2019 who helped Deng Xiaoping launch China\u2019s pro-market turn in the years following Mao\u2019s death. In today\u2019s class-ridden China, the princelings are the new nobility, with vast inherited power and wealth. Bo, as Time magazine (25 July 2011) commented, \u201cis hardly a revolutionary: he favours luxury cars and suits and sent his son to Harrow [an elite private school in England] and Oxford [university]\u201d. The younger Bo, a third-generation princeling, joined Oxford\u2019s Adam Smith Institute.<\/span><\/p>\n

The princelings have acquired enormous power in China\u2019s \u2018state capitalist\u2019 economy, both in private business and as heads of powerful state monopoly enterprises, which are often run as clan fiefdoms. As a Wikileaks report revealed, based on a 2009 cable from the US embassy in Beijing, it was \u201cwell known\u201d that former Chinese premier Li Peng and his family controlled China\u2019s electric power interests, while the country\u2019s police chief Zhou Yongkang controlled the state monopoly of the oil sector. The wife of China\u2019s premier Wen Jiabao is said to control China\u2019s precious gems sector, the cable stated.<\/span><\/p>\n

The \u2018party of princelings\u2019 enjoys great influence within the CCP, but more as a network of family-based loyalties than a political faction. Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai are both princelings but Xi is seen as an economic liberal, for example when he ran Zhejiang province, seen as a stronghold of private capitalism in China. But tensions within the CCP between the princelings and other officials are becoming sharper. The same Wikileaks report claimed that princeling officials derided officials from grassroots backgrounds as \u2018shopkeepers\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

The \u2018Tuanpai<\/i>\u2019 party faction around president Hu Jintao (which takes its name from the Communist Youth League from where many of its members originate), wants to limit the power of the princelings who form the core of the \u2018vested interests\u2019 seen as blocking \u2018reform\u2019. The moves against Bo therefore also reflect an attempt by Hu and the \u2018Tuanpai<\/i>\u2019 to weaken princeling influence ahead of the autumn succession. Xi, a princeling, will replace Hu as party chief and next year also as president. This was decided at the last congress in 2007, and represented a setback for Hu\u2019s faction, whose preferred candidate was Hu prot\u00e9g\u00e9 Li Keqiang. Li will instead assume Wen\u2019s responsibilities as Premier, a lesser role.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The seat that Bo seemed set to take on the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) will now almost certainly be taken by another supporter of ex-president Jiang (another princeling), possibly Bo\u2019s successor in Chongqing, Zhang Dejiang. But Bo\u2019s dismissal is undoubtedly also indirectly aimed at checking the \u2018party of princelings\u2019 and their designs on the new leadership, especially the nine-member PSC. The implications of this conflict therefore go beyond the rise or fall of the Chongqing model. As the global capitalist crisis deepens and China\u2019s economy falters, sharp divisions within the party-state will increasingly burst into the open. Making an example of Bo Xilai will not repair the facade of \u2018party unity\u2019 other than perhaps for a temporary period.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Local<\/a>
Local government debt as share of GDP<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Economic \u2018reform\u2019
<\/b><\/span>
The recent NPC meeting was \u201ca house of representatives of officials and businesspeople\u201d according to Wang Guixi, a professor at the Central Party School in Beijing. As reported on chinaworker.info last week, the richest 70 NPC members \u2013 with an astonishing combined wealth of 565.8 billion yuan (US$85 billion) \u2013 are more than ten times wealthier than the 535 members of the US government, Congress, and Supreme Court. Internet commentators called the NPC session a \u201cwealth-showing-off-party\u201d and published photos of the luxury goods adorning various delegates. The chairman of Evergrande Real Estate Group, Xu Jiayin, was spotted wearing a 6,000 yuan waist belt \u2013 almost a year\u2019s income for the average farmer (6.977 yuan). The daughter of former premier Li Peng (the Butcher of Beijing), Li Xiaolin, who is CEO of China Power International Development, was photographed in a pink Emilio Pucci suit valued at 12,000 yuan.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In his two-hour opening work report, Premier Wen used the word \u2018reform\u2019 70 times. But rather than political reform (which he did mention in his attack on Bo Xilai ten days later), Wen was referring only to economic so-called \u2018reform\u2019, which is code for more pro-capitalist measures.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Prior to the NPC, a joint report by the World Bank and several Chinese government agencies was unveiled, calling for sweeping deregulation, privatization and break-up of state monopolies. This 470-page document is remarkable not just for its proposals, unlikely ever to be fully realised, but because of the degree of coordination between the World Bank, in which China is now the third largest shareholder, and the Beijing regime. The full title of the report,\u00a0China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High Income Society<\/i>, gives the game away. The word \u2018harmonious\u2019 is a buzzword of Hu Jintao\u2019s and unlikely to have originated from outside of the CCP. Notably, the word \u2018democracy\u2019 is not mentioned once in the document.<\/span><\/p>\n

The conclusions of this document, rightly slammed as a \u2018neo-liberal manifesto\u2019 by left commentators, were echoed by Premier Wen in his work report to the NPC. He promised to \u201cbreak up monopolies\u201d and bring more \u201cnon-governmental investment in railways, public utilities, finance, energy, telecommunications, education and medical care\u201d. Wen again pledged greater support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). A recurring theme at the NPC meeting was the need for tax cuts on businesses and to boost the spending of the middle-class. It remains to be seen how much of this renewed push for economic \u2018restructuring and reform\u2019 materialises. But what is clear is that the CCP leaders are deeply alarmed by the real economic situation in China, hidden behind the dazzle of its GDP figures. The debt mountain accumulated especially by local governments since the massive 2008 stimulus package (see chart above \u2013 although the full scale of this indebtedness may be much worse than official figures suggest), means they must attempt to break from the current economic model with its crushing dependence on debt-financed investment, which is also creating monumental overcapacity. The crisis in the housing market is one sign of wider problems, with the current value of vacant properties being held by developers and speculators worth over 100 percent of China\u2019s GDP.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The reform camp want to \u2018unleash the dragon\u2019 of consumer spending to reduce the economy\u2019s lopsided dependence on exports and investment. But China\u2019s anaemic consumption-to-GDP ratio (far lower than in Brazil, India and Russia) flows from its current economic model, based on low-wage, low-tech and low-profit manufacturing and assembly. To shift away from this model they want to subject the state-owned giants to greater competition from private capital, opening up former monopoly sectors while not relinquishing control fully. The government is considering legalising the underground banks and liberalizing interest rates (allowing banks to set so-called market rates) in order for capital to be allocated \u2018more efficiently\u2019 (i.e. where profits are highest). Such classical liberal economic nostrums are the best the current CCP leaders can come up with, despite the evident failure of these ideas in practise everywhere around the world.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

These policies are a recipe for massive social unrest, as many NPC delegates openly recognised. To sugar this nasty pill, the government, again echoing the World Bank report, pledges to step up provision of medical insurance, pensions, and other rudimentary forms of welfare, all of which \u2013 in theory \u2013 should spur more consumer spending. But such promises have been made before, with few real improvements reaching the mass of poor Chinese. It is not the central government, which for example only funds around one-tenth of the cost of the country\u2019s healthcare, but local governments that must fund any expansion of social security and welfare spending. But as we have seen, these local governments are grappling with an unprecedented debt overhang.<\/span><\/p>\n

Political reform?<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

When Wen and his supporters speak of \u2018political reform\u2019 and this being \u2018inseparable from\u2019 economic reform, they are not speaking about elections, freedom of association, the right to strike, or other democratic freedoms. With views not radically different from Bo Xilai and the neo-authoritarian wing of the CCP, the reformers want to preserve the one-party dictatorship, while making \u2018improvements\u2019. A gradualist and controlled approach reflects the deep-seated fears of the Chinese elite of \u2018chaos\u2019 should the masses be allowed to engage in politics. Their main focus, rather than democracy, is a more independent judiciary (so called rule of law), greater press freedoms, and a bigger role for (approved) NGOs.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The aim of such measures is to exert pressure \u2013 by select groups rather than the masses \u2013 upon government and government-owned companies to reduce corruption and abuses. Rather than democracy of any description, this is about giving private economic interests greater possibilities to challenge and compete with state-owned \u2018vested interests\u2019 and in this way compel the latter to adopt more efficient, market-based, less corrupt, practices. Again, this is a chimera. Capitalist regimes everywhere, of both the democratic and authoritarian type, have shown themselves incapable of using society\u2019s resources in a rational way. If the liberal refomers are right, why are European and US capitalism in deep crisis today?<\/span><\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s attempts ahead of the leadership transition to talk up its reform ambitions are therefore clearly linked to the purge of Bo Xilai, and the blow thus delivered to the \u2018new left\u2019. Zhang Ming, a political science professor at Beijing\u2019s Renmin University told the Washington Post: \u201cThe Chongqing model is also over, and the chance of [China] turning leftward is finished.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

The last part of this statement will be disproved by events, and sooner rather than later, with inevitable and massive leftward shifts among the masses. In contrast to the neo-Maoists who saw Bo\u2019s policies as an alternative to the capitalist policies of the central government, Marxists and the supporters of chinaworker.info stress the need for a genuine left alternative. For this we must look outside the corrupt business-dominated structures of the CCP and all its factions. There can be no illusions in either the \u2018reformers\u2019 of the Wen Jiabao-Wang Yang School or the authoritarian \u2018left\u2019 of Bo Xilai.<\/span><\/p>\n

An alternative must be built from below and based on mass grassroots struggle, not on the cult of a \u2018new Mao\u2019. It must learn from and interact with international workers\u2019 struggles, eschewing the Great China nationalism of sections of the neo-Maoist left. A real alternative requires the building of a fighting working class party committed to socialism and genuine grassroots democracy. This is what the supporters of the CWI are fighting for.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Chinese<\/a>
Chinese government hosts forum to launch new World Bank report<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Note: The Committee for a Workers’ International (CWI) changed its name to International Socialist Alternative (ISA) in 2020. Chinaworker.info is published by ISA in China.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

For the first time in two decades an open power struggle erupts within China\u2019s one-party state<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":31983,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"tdm_status":"","tdm_grid_status":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[132,404,407,124,154],"tags":[238,207,37418],"class_list":{"0":"post-3189","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-china","8":"category-features","9":"category-history","10":"category-news","11":"category-theory","12":"tag-bo-xilai","13":"tag-ccp","14":"tag-princeling"},"yoast_head":"\nChina: The fall of Bo Xilai - China Worker<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/chinaworker.info\/en\/2012\/03\/18\/3189\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"China: The fall of Bo Xilai - 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